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Agricultural Recovery in CIS: Lessons of 15 Years of Land 
Reform and Farm Restructuring 
1
The objective of this paper is to examine the impacts of land reform policies in C IS countries 
on agricultural performance, including growth and productivity. The focal thesis of the study 
is that agricultural development in CIS is mainly driven by policy factors, and it is changes in 
policies (whether agricultural or general economic) that cumulatively affect growth, 
employment, and productivity in the large rural sector in CIS. International development 
organizations, such as the World Bank, USAID, and FAO, have a clear role in these countries 
because of their large rural population and the strong dependence on agriculture as a source 
of family incomes. Continuing policy advice can help on two interlinked levels: (a) helping 
CIS farmers achieve higher profitability and thus accelerate capital formation through 
farming activities; (b) helping CIS farmers use their accumulated profits to diversify into 
non-agricultural activities as an essential component of a new rural (as distinct from 
agricultural) development orientation. 
 
The data used in this report are taken from official statistical sources of the 12 CIS countries. 
An authoritative database is published annually on a CD-ROM by the Interstate Statistical 
Committee of the CIS in Moscow, utilizing statistics regularly reported by the member 
countries. In this study we have used the 2005 database (CIS, 2005). The CIS database covers 
all the years from 1980 to 2004, and thus provides a useful comparative view of the last 
decade of the Soviet regime and the 15 years of transition. Some inevitable gaps in the CIS 
database have been filled in from country yearbooks.  
 
Setting the stage 
 
The 12 former Soviet republics that form the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 
span three geographical regions – the European part of the former Soviet Union, 
Transcaucasia, and Central Asia (Table 1). Russia is generally regarded as a “European” 
country, although a huge part of its territory (though not population) is in Asia. In addition to 
geographical location, the CIS countries are usually classified into “small” and “large” by 
both population and area. Turkmenistan is generally regarded as a “small” country because of 
its small population (5-6 million), although its territory – mostly desert – is the fourth largest 
in CIS after Russia, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. Uzbekistan has a large population but a 
relatively small territory. It is accordingly classified as “medium” in Table 1 and is lumped 
with the small countries for purposes of analysis.  
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Expected, What We Observed, The Lessons Learned, Corvinus University, Budapest, September 6-8, 2007. The 
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Regional Office for Europe and Central Asia in Rome. Close collaboration with David Sedik, Head of the 
Regional Office’s Policy Assistance Branch (REUP), greatly contributed to this study. The author wishes to 
acknowledge the insightful comments of John Nash and Paloma Anos of the World Bank on an earlier draft. 2 
 
Table 1. A typology of CIS countries 
  Location  Size  Income categories  ECA Agricultural 
Policy Index (2004) 
ECA Land Reform 
Index (2004) 
Russia  “Europe”  Large  Middle Income  6.2  5 
Ukraine  “Europe”  Large  Lower Middle Income  6.2  6 
Belarus  “Europe”  Large  Middle Income  2.6  2 
Moldova  “Europe”  Small  Low Income  6.0  7 
Armenia  Transcaucasia  Small  Low Income  7.8  9 
Georgia  Transcaucasia  Small  Low Income  6.0  7 
Azerbaijan  Transcaucasia  Small  Low Income  6.6  9 
Kazakhstan  Central Asia  Large  Middle Income  6.2  5 
Kyrgyzstan  Central Asia  Small  Low Income  7.4  8 
Tajikistan  Central Asia  Small  Low Income  5.2  6 
Turkmenistan  Central Asia  Small  Lower Middle Income  1.8  2 
Uzbekistan  Central Asia  Medium  Low Income  4.0  5 
 
Another useful classification of the CIS countries is into “poor” and “not poor”. This 
classification can be based, in particular, on GNI per capita, which is shown in Figure 1 for 
all 12 countries (in PPP $). In Table 1, the 12 countries are categorized into Low Income, 
Lower Middle Income, and Middle Income based on WDI thresholds for these income 
















  Figure 1. 
 
 
The last two columns in Table 1 give the World Bank’s ECA Agricultural Policy Reform 
Index and the ECA Land Reform Index, which quantify the status of agricultural reforms in 
each country as of the end of 2004.
2 The ECA Agricultural Policy Index is a composite 
measure that incorporates progress with land reform (as expressed by the Land Reform Index) 
and four additional components: liberalization of agricultural markets, privatization and 
demonopolization of agricultural services (both upstream and downstream), establishment of 
an institutional framework for market agriculture, and development of rural finance.  
 
The ECA Agricultural Policy Reform Index is constructed on a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 
corresponds to a command economy and 10 to an economy with completed market reforms. 
                                                 
2 The World Bank’s ECA Agricultural Policy Reform Index was introduced in 1997 (Csaki and Nash, 1998) and 
subsequently updated on an annual basis. For latest updates see Csaki and Kray (2005).  
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Accordingly, countries with policy reform index above 7 are characterized as advanced 
reformers, countries with policy reform index between 6 and 7 are moderate reformers, and 
countries with policy reform index below 6 are slow reformers. Among the CIS countries, 
only Armenia and Kyrgyzstan are advanced reformers. Most countries – Russia, Ukraine, 
Kazakhstan, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Georgia – are moderate reformers. Belarus and three 
Central Asian States – Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan – are classified as slow 
reformers. In terms of regional classification, all three Transcaucasian countries are in the top 
two groups of advanced in moderate reformers, whereas three of the five Central Asian states 
(with the exception of Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan) are in the bottom group of slow reformers. 
The ranking by the ECA Agricultural Policy Index is closely correlated with rankings by 
other popular indices, such as the EBRD Transition Index or the Freedom House Index. 
 
Land reform and changing farm structure in CIS  
 
The land reform component of the ECA Agricultural Policy Index (see the last column in 
Table 1) essentially measures how far land tenure and farm structure have advanced from the 
socialist model of predominantly large-scale collective agriculture to the market model with 
predominance of relatively small family-operated units. This approach to land reform 
emphasizes individualization of agriculture – and not just privatization of land in the formal 
sense of ownership transfer from the state to private owners or the establishment of 
sophisticated land titling and registration systems. Table 2 summarizes the different forms of 
land tenure and farm structure that have emerged across the CIS countries as a result of 
differences in the implementation of land reform. 
 
Table 2. Differences in implementation of land reform in CIS 





Transferability  Farm organization  Watershed date for 
individualization  
Armenia  All  Plots  Buy/sell, lease  Individual  1992 
Georgia  All  Plots  Buy/sell, lease  Individual  1992 
Azerbaijan  All  Plots  Buy/sell, lease  Individual  1996 
Moldova  All  Shares to plots  Buy/sell, lease  Individual + corporate  1998 
Ukraine  All  Shares to plots  Buy/sell, lease  Individual + corporate  2000 
Kyrgyzstan  All  Shares to plots  Buy/sell, lease  Individual + corporate   1998 
Kazakhstan  All  Shares to plots*  Buy/sell, lease  Individual + corporate  2003 
Russia  All  Shares  Buy/sell, lease  Corporate + individual  ** 
Tajikistan  None  Shares to plots  Use rights  Individual + corporate  1999 
Turkmenistan  All  Leasehold  None  Individual leaseholds  1998 
Uzbekistan  None  Leasehold  None  Individual leaseholds  2004 
Belarus  Household 
plots only 
None  None  Corporate + individual  ** 
*The June 2003 Land Code practically annulled the permanent rights associated with land shares and forced the 
share-holders either to acquire a land plot from the state (by outright purchase or by leasing) or to invest the land 
share in the equity capital of a corporate farm.  
**In Russia and Belarus individual farms began to be created in 1992, but the process of individualization has 
not taken off as in other countries. 
 
Land privatization in the strictly legal sense of “destatization” of land ownership has been 
implemented by most CIS countries. Only three countries – Belarus, Uzbekistan, and 
Tajikistan – retain exclusive state ownership of land, while Turkmenistan allows a curious 
form of private land ownership that rules out transferability and is thus stripped of the main 
characteristics of private property. Individualization of land tenure shows much greater 
diversity across the CIS countries. Armenia and Georgia resolutely individualized their 4 
 
agriculture back in 1992 by distributing all land traditionally held by large collectives to rural 
households. Azerbaijan followed in 1996. In these three countries, virtually all agricultural 
land today is in individual tenure and family farms produce almost the entire agricultural 
output. The average Land Reform Index for these three countries is accordingly 8.3 out of 10. 
At the other extreme we find Russia and Belarus, where family farms now exist in much 
greater numbers than before 1991, but 80%-90% of agricultural land is still controlled by 
large former collectives. The Land Reform Index for these conservative countries is 3.5. In 
the middle there are Moldova and Ukraine, with an average Land Reform Index of 6.5: these 
countries initially followed the Russian model of distributing land to the rural population in 
the form of paper certificates of entitlement (“land shares”) but ultimately began to convert 
the paper shares into physical land plots given to rural households (Moldova in 1998, Ukraine 
in 2000). In Central Asia, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan follow their own peculiar strategy of 
farm individualization, which is based on leasehold arrangements entrusting the cultivation of 
farm land to rural families through lease contracts linked to production quotas. In Kazakhstan 
individual farms predominantly rely on land leased from the state, although private land 
ownership was formally recognized in the June 2003 Land Code. Tajik farmers 
individualized their holdings, mainly after 1999, by converting land shares to plots of state-
owned land in use rights. Kyrgyzstan made important progress toward full recognition of 
private land ownership in 1999-2000, and this policy change was followed by significant 
distribution of land to individuals and families. The Land Reform Index for Central Asian 
countries reflects the variability in their land reform policies, ranging from a low of 5 for 
Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan to a high of 8 for Kyrgyzstan. 
 5 
 
Changes of agrarian scene 
 
Most CIS countries are generally regarded as highly agrarian, especially compared to 
Western Europe and North America. The rural or agrarian character of a country can be 
assessed by three indicators: the share of rural population (in percent of total population), the 
share of agricultural employment (in percent of total employment), and the share of 
agricultural Gross Value Added (GVA) in the country’s GDP. These components of a 
country’s agrarian profile are given in Table 3, which also calculates an ad hoc “agrarian 
index” of each country as the arithmetic average of the three components (the agrarian index 
is thus expressed in percent). This is an aggregate characteristic of a country’s agrarian nature 
(Figure 2). 
 
Table 3. The agrarian profile of CIS countries (2004 or latest available data) 
 
Share of rural 
population 
Share of 
agriculture in total 
employment 
Share of 
agriculture in GDP  Agrarian index 
Azerbaijan  48.5  40.0  11.3  33.2 
Armenia  35.9  45.8  22.7  34.8 
Belarus  28.0  10.7  8.9  15.9 
Georgia  47.8  58.6  16.0  40.8 
Kazakhstan  42.9  33.2  7.9  28.0 
Kyrgyzstan  65.1  51.8  32.9  49.9 
Moldova  59.0  40.4  18.2  39.2 
Russia  27.0  11.0  5.1  14.4 
Tajikistan  73.6  67.6  24.2  55.1 
Turkmenistan  56.4  no data available  20.2  38.3 
Uzbekistan  62.6  no data available  28.3  45.4 















    Figure 2. 
 
 
The highest income countries – Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan – are also the least 
agrarian (Figure 2). The poorest country – Tajikistan – has the highest agrarian index. 
Overall, there is a strong negative correlation between the agrarian index and income per 
capita: as the agrarian index increases, GNI per capita decreases (see Figure 3; the 
coefficient of correlation is −0.9). This inverse relationship between the country’s agrarian 
profile and per capita income is a standard empirical fact in development economics 
Agrarian Index*
*Average of rural population share, ag employment share, and ag share in GDP









(Chenery and Syrquin 1975). We now proceed to examine the changes in the components of 




















Examining the changes in the share of rural population over time, we notice that the 12 CIS 
countries fall into three distinct groups (Table 4; Figures 4A, 4B, 4C):  
(1) The group of 5 countries where the average share of rural population increased between 
1980-90 and 1991-2005. These five countries – Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, 
Uzbekistan in Central Asia and Azerbaijan in Transcaucasis – are undergoing increasing 
ruralization, which is a surprising phenomenon in the developed world.  
(2) The three Slavic countries – Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus – are undergoing increasing 
urbanization, as is evident from the decrease in their share of rural population.  
(3) In the remaining four countries – Armenia and Georgia in Transcaucasia,  Kazakhstan in 
Central Asia, and Moldova in the European CIS – the share of rural population did not 
change over time. 
 
The share of rural population increased between 1980-90 and 1991-2005 in countries with 
growing rural population, such as Central Asia and Azerbaijan (see the last two columns in 
Table 4). This implies that the rural population in these countries is growing faster than the 
urban population – another facet of ruralization. On the other hand, in countries characterized 
by declining or unchanged share of rural population, the rural population is generally 
shrinking, either due to the overall population decline or to faster growth of urban population. 
The different growth patterns of rural population in the two groups of countries are shown in 
Figure 5, where the rural population index (with 1980=100) has been aggregated as the 
arithmetic average of the indices for the group of six countries with growing rural population 
















































          Figure  4C. 
 
Share of rural population increasing 1980-2005


















Share of rural population unchanged 1980-2005











Table 4. Changes in share of rural population between 1980-90 and 1997-2005 
Country  1980-90  1991-96  1997-05 
Direction of change  









Tajikistan  67  71  73  Up  194 (2005)  Growing 
Kyrgyzstan  62  63  65  Up  148 (2004)  Growing 
Uzbekistan  59  61  62  Up  164 (2000)  Growing 
Turkmenistan  54  55  56  Up  183 (2001)  Growing 
Azerbaijan  47  47  49  Up  140 (2005)  Growing 
Armenia  33  32  34  No change  109 (2005)  Growing 
Moldova  57  54  58  No change/Down  88 (2004)  Declining 
Georgia  47  46  47  No change  84 (2004)  Declining 
Kazakhstan  44  44  44  No change  94 (2005)  Declining 
Belarus  39  32  30  Down   65 (2005)  Declining 
Ukraine  36  32  32  Down  80 (2005)  Declining 






















While the share of rural population behaved over time differently for different groups of 
countries, the share of agricultural employment increased over time in all CIS countries, 
except Belarus. Even in Russia and Ukraine, where the share of rural population declined, the 
share of employed in agriculture increased between 1980-89 and 1990-2004 (albeit slightly). 
The countries that showed the strongest increase in agricultural employment were Tajikistan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Armenia, and Moldova (Figure 6, Table 5). There is no clear relationship 
between the change in rural population and the change in agricultural employment in the two 
periods. 
 
The additional labor force came into agricultural through layoffs in manufacturing industries, 
as the share of industrial employment decreased in all CIS countries between 1980-89 and 
1990-2004. The share of employment in other sectors (services, construction, extractive 
industries) shows a variable pattern: in some countries these sectors absorbed part of the slack 
Rural population growth in CIS 1980-2005
Up: Arm, Az, Kyr, Taj, Tur, Uzb; Down: Gru, Mol, Kaz, Bel, Rus, Ukr














from the shrinking industries, while in other countries these sectors also contributed to the 





















Table  5. Changes in share of agricultural employment by subperiods between 1980 and 2004 (percent of 
all employed) 
  1980-89  1990-95  1996-04  1990-04 
Tajikistan  42  50  64  58 
Turkmenistan  40  43  47  45 
Uzbekistan  38  43  38  40 
Moldova  37  40  47  44 
Kyrgyzstan  32  39  49  45 
Azerbaijan  33  32  37  35 
Georgia  27  29  30  30 
Kazakhstan  23  23  28  26 
Armenia  20  29  43  37 
Ukraine  21  20  22  22 
Russia  14  14  16  15 
Belarus  23  19  14  17 
 
Figure 7 shows the changes in sectoral structure of employment between 1980-89 and 1990-
2004. The changes are in percentage points, calculated by taking the difference between the 
share of employment of each of the three sectors in 1980-89 and the corresponding share in 
1990-2004. The changes for the three sectors – agriculture, manufacturing industries, and 
other sectors – sum to zero in each country. The light-gray upward bars represent agriculture: 
here the change in share of agricultural employment was positive in all countries, except 
Belarus. The dark-gray bars represent the decline of the share of manufacturing industries in 
total employment: these bars always point downward, signifying decline in the share of 
industry in all CIS countries. Finally, the black bars represent the change in the share of 
employment in all other sectors: some point down (negative change), others point up 
(positive change). In terms of intersectoral labor flows we distinguish three groups of 
countries. In the first group (Armenia, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, and Turkmenistan) 
agriculture expanded at the expense of labor ejected from all non-agricultural sectors of the 
economy (including manufacturing industries). In the second group (Kazakhstan, Georgia, 
Azerbaijan, Russia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan), industry was the only source of labor for both 
agriculture and the other sectors of the economy (in these countries, the share of agricultural 
labor increased to a much smaller extent than in the first group). Finally, Belarus on its own 
Share of agricultural employment 1980-2004












falls in the third group, where both agriculture and industry shrank, releasing labor for other 















    Figure 7. 
 
 
Table 6 shows the average sectoral structure of employment in three periods (1980-89, 1990-
95, and 1996-2004) obtained by aggregating the employment shares data over the CIS 
countries in the two main groups identified in Figure 7 (excluding Russia and Ukraine, as 
well as Belarus). The data in the table confirm the previous conclusions: the share of 
agriculture in employment increased for both groups of countries, but especially so for group 
A; the share of industry in employment declined for both groups roughly to the same extent; 
the share of employment in other sectors decreased for group A countries and did not change 
for group B countries. Agriculture thus absorbed the layoffs from all the sectors of the 
economy in group A countries and from industry only in group B countries. 
 
Table 6. Changes in sectoral structure of employment between 1980 and 2004 for the two groups of 
countries from Figure 7 
    Group A      Group B   
1980-89  1990-95  1996-2004  1980-89  1990-95  1996-2004 
Agriculture  34  40  50  30  32  39 
Industry  19  16  11  19  15  10 
Other sectors  47  44  39  51  53  51 
Group A: Arm, Taj, Kyr, Mol, Tur 
Group B: Kaz, Gru, Az, Uzb 
 
Figure 8 shows the average sectoral structure of employment in three periods obtained by 
aggregating the employment shares data over all CIS countries (except Russia, Ukraine, and 
Belarus), without dividing them into two groups. The figure clearly shows that, overall, the 
increase in share of agricultural employment was achieved primarily at the expense of layoffs 
in industry, as the share of the other sectors did not change much between the three periods. 
The results remain practically the same when Russia and Ukraine are included.  
Changes in employment structure between
 1980-89 and 1990-2004































Share of agriculture in GDP 
 
While many statistical data for CIS countries are available since 1980 (and even earlier), 
internationally acceptable GDP data began to be calculated as part of the new National 
Accounts systems that replaced the traditional Soviet “material product” statistics around 
1992. Comparable and consistent calculations of the share of agriculture in GDP across the 
CIS countries could therefore be carried out only for the period since 1993. Furthermore, 
absolute values of GDP required for calculating the share of agriculture are available only in 
current prices in national currencies, and constant-price data are published only in the form of 
year-to-year changes of total GDP.  
 
Subject to these restrictions, we proceeded to calculate the share of agriculture and the share 
of industry in GDP in current prices using the available data from 1993 through 2004 for 7 of 
the 12 CIS countries: Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and 
Moldova. Two other Central Asian countries, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, had to be 
dropped from the analysis due to lack of data, while Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus were 
omitted as falling outside the scope of interest of the present study. 
 
Visual examination of the pooled data for the 7 countries followed by a simple trend analysis 
for 1993-2004 (Table 7) revealed two basic facts: (1) the share of agriculture in GDP 
declined over time (producing a trend line with a statistically significant negative coefficient); 
(2) the share of industry in GDP did not have a statistically significant trend coefficient 
(either positive or negative).  
 
Table 7. Trend analysis of shares of agriculture and industry in GDP for 7 CIS countries, 1993-2004 
  Trend coefficient 1993-2004  Significance  R-square 
Share of agriculture in GDP  −1.637  <0.0001  0.265 
Share of industry in GDP  −0.052  0.8224  0.001 
 
Based on these preliminary findings, we divided the 12-year period 1993-2004 into two 6-
year subperiods 1993-1998 and 1999-2004 and calculated the average share of agriculture 
and industry in GDP by country for each subperiod. The results are presented in Figures 9A 
and 9B.  
Changes in sectoral structure of employment* 








































     
    Figure 9B. 
 
 
These figures visually reinforce the trend results from Table 7. In Figure 9A, the share of 
agriculture in the second subperiod 1999-2004 is less than the share of agriculture in the first 
subperiod 1993-98 for each of the 7 countries shown: this is consistent with the negative 
trend coefficient for the share of agriculture in GDP in Table 7. In Figure 9B, the share of 
industry in 1999-2004 is higher than in 1993-98 for four of the seven countries (Azerbaijan, 
Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan), lower than in 1993-98 for two of the seven countries 
(Armenia and Moldova), and practically unchanged for one country (Tajikistan). This is 
again consistent with the trend analysis results, which give a zero trend coefficient for the 
share of industry in GDP.  
 
Table 8. Sectoral structure of GDP and its change over time for 7 CIS countries 
  1993-2004  1993-1998  1999-2004 
Agriculture  26  31  22 
Industry  23  22  23 
Other sectors  51  47  55 
 
The average sectoral structure of GDP for all seven countries is shown in Table 8. The two 
notable features of the observed changes over time are the decrease in the share of agriculture 
(from 31% of GDP in 1993-1998 to 22% in 1999-2004) and the increase of the other non-
Shares of industry in GDP: 1993-98 and 1999-2004
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manufacturing sectors (construction, services, extractive industries, etc.) from 47% of GDP in 
1993-1998 to 55% in 1999-2004. 
 
Table 9. Change in relative productivity of labor in agriculture and industry between 1993-1998 and 
1999-2004 
 
Agriculture  Industry 
1993-1998  1999-2004  1993-1998  1999-2004 
Azerbaijan  0.79  0.37  2.82  4.99 
Armenia  0.94  0.56  1.21  1.47 
Georgia  1.05  0.39  0.95  2.40 
Kazakhstan  0.56  0.26  1.50  2.27 
Kyrgyzstan  0.89  0.65  1.37  2.40 
Moldova  0.63  0.47  2.08  1.50 
Tajikistan  0.56  0.38  2.51  3.73 
Average (6 countries)  0.78  0.44  1.78  2.68 
 
We have observed previously that the share of employment in agriculture on the whole 
increased over time, whereas the share of employment in manufacturing industries decreased. 
We now see that the shares of the two sectors in GDP moved in opposite directions relative to 
their shares in employment. This suggests that the productivity of labor in agriculture may 
have declined over time, whereas the productivity of labor in industry may have increased. 
This conclusion, however, needs to be verified, as the employment and GDP data presented 
so far correspond to different time frames and to different sets of countries. Table 9 gives the 
relative productivity of labor in agriculture and industry, calculated as the ratio of the sectoral 
share in GDP to sectoral share in employment. The relative productivity for the entire 
economy of each country is 1, as 100% of GDP is produced by 100% of labor. Relative 
productivity of less than 1 implies that the corresponding sector is less efficient than the 
average for the economy as a whole, whereas relative productivity of more than 1 implies that 
the sector is more efficient than the economy on average. The results in Table 9 for a subset 
of 7 countries with full matching data for both employment and GDP shares support our 
tentative hypothesis: the relative productivity of agricultural labor was lower in 1999-2004 
than in 1993-1998 (0.44 compared with 0.78 for all 7 countries), whereas the relative 
productivity of labor in the manufacturing industries increased over time (2.68 in 1999-2004 
compared with 1.78 in 1993-1998). 14 
 
Productivity of resource use in agriculture 
 
While agricultural production relies on a whole range of resources, land and labor are clearly 
the two main inputs. Fortunately, sufficiently reliable and consistent time-series data are 
available on both land and labor in official statistics of CIS countries. Information on other 
factors of production, such as farm machinery, capital assets, purchased inputs, fuel, is 
fragmentary and much less reliable and in most cases can be used only for cross-section 
analysis at a single point in time (e.g., in farm surveys). In this section we will describe the 
evolution of agricultural land and agricultural labor in CIS countries over time and apply this 
information to calculate the partial productivity of these factors.  
 
Evolution of agricultural land over time 
 
Agricultural land is naturally characterized by high inertia and we do not expect to see wild 
fluctuations in land stocks from year to year. During the last decade of Soviet rule (1980-89) 
agricultural land remained fairly constant in all CIS countries. After 1990, however, we are 
beginning to witness more variability, which may be attributable to purely technical reasons, 
i.e., changes in statistical systems, or to substantive changes in farm structure and producer 
behavior during the transition from plan to market. Table 10 presents information on changes 
in agricultural land in CIS countries from 1980 to 1989 and then to 2004. The information is 
presented as percentage change since 1980 for each country. 
 
Table 10. Change of agricultural land in CIS 1980-1989 and 1980-2004 (1980=100) 
  1980-1989  1980-2004 
  Percent of 1980  Characterization  Percent of 1980  Characterization 
Turkmenistan  111  Increase (irrigation)  134  Increase (irrigation) 
Azerbaijan  102  No  significant change  113  Increase (irrigation) 
Armenia  101  No  significant change  104  No  significant change 
Tajikistan  102  No  significant change  98  No  significant change 
Moldova  98  No  significant change  95  No  significant change 
Georgia  101  No  significant change  94  No  significant change 
Belarus  97  No  significant change  92  No  significant change 
Ukraine  99  No  significant change  89  Moderate decline 
Russia  98  No  significant change  88  Moderate decline 
Uzbekistan  101  No  significant change  76  Significant decline 
Kyrgyzstan  100  No  significant change  45  Significant decline 
Kazakhstan  102  No  significant change  40  Significant decline 
 
During the Soviet period 1980-1989, agricultural land in all countries (with the exception of 
Turkmenistan) remained virtually constant, fluctuating within 2% up and down. 
Turkmenistan was the only exception, as ambitious irrigation projects in this desert country 
increased the stock of agricultural land by as much as 11% during the decade 1980-1989. The 
transition period brought significant variability in the behavior of agricultural land across 
countries. By 2004, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan had much more agricultural land than in 
1980 (due to extensive irrigation projects). Uzbekistan and especially Kyrgyzstan and 
Kazakhstan had gone through a period of serious land abandonment. Russia and Ukraine 
registered moderate declines in agricultural land, also mainly through abandonment, while 
the remaining countries – Armenia, Tajikistan, Moldova, Georgia, and Belarus – maintained 
their agricultural land largely unchanged, although with a slight tendency to decline.  
 15 
 
Evolution of agricultural labor over time 
 
In a previous section we showed that the share of agriculture in total employment (expressed 
in percent) increased over time in all CIS countries, with the exception of Belarus. We now 
proceed to examine the changes in the absolute number of employed in agriculture since 1980. 
Because of huge differences in scale (ranging from about 10 million employed in Russia to 
less than half a million in Armenia or Kyrgyzstan), the actual number of workers in each 
country is normalized to an index number with 1980=100. Changes in agricultural labor over 
time are thus expressed in percent of the number of employed in the base year of 1980.  
 
Figure 10 collapses the 12 time series into three aggregate curves: one for the three 
Transcaucasian countries (Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan), one for the five Central Asian 
countries (Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan), and one for 
the four “European” countries (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova). This classification is 
based on geographical location, ignoring the size. While all the Transcaucasian countries are 
small, the Central Asian group includes one large country (Kazakhstan) and the European 
















    Figure 10. 
 
 
We see from Figure 10 that the agricultural labor in the European CIS countries is steadily 
(and fairly slowly) decreasing over time. This trend is not related to transition: it goes back to 
1980 and is part of the long-term of exit of labor from agriculture in the relatively developed 
and high-income countries of the European CIS. On the other hand, agricultural employment 
in Central Asia is increasing, and at that fairly rapidly. Again, this trend is observed since 
1980 and does not appear to be related to transition. It is apparently driven by the high 
population growth rates in these countries and the increasing rural population. Finally, in the 
three Transcaucasian countries agricultural labor began to grow in 1990, and it seems to be 
linked to transition, especially to the fast transformation of the farm structure from the 
traditional Soviet collectives to small family farms (it is empirically known that family farms 
act as “labor sink”, attracting much more workers per unit of land or unit of other resources 
than large corporate farms; see Lerman and Schreinemachers (2005)). 
 
It is tempting to hypothesize that the growth or decline of agricultural labor is linked at least 
to two factors: population growth and growth of non-agricultural sectors of the economy. 
Agricultural labor: CIS 1980-2004












Population growth, and especially rural population growth, affects the supply of labor and 
may thus create upward pressures on agricultural labor. Growth in non-agricultural sectors of 
the economy (manufacturing industry, extractive industry, construction, transport, services) 
creates alternative employment opportunities and may thus encourage migration of labor out 
of agriculture. The reality is not as clear cut as this, and given the available statistics it is 
impossible to identify rigorously the drivers of agricultural employment. Thus, the share of 
agriculture in GDP is decreasing in all CIS countries: this is clear from Figure 9A, which 
shows the change in the share of agriculture in GDP for 7 of the 12 countries; the picture is 
practically the same for three additional countries – Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus; the 
remaining two countries – Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan – simply do not provide the relevant 
data. The share of non-agricultural sectors in GDP correspondingly increases in all CIS 
countries, and we cannot use this crude percentage statistic to explain the highly variable 



















The population growth statistics are better for our purposes, as the variability in annual 
population growth rates is quite high. Figure 11 shows for the 12 CIS countries the 
relationship between the annual rates of change in agricultural labor and  in rural population 
between 1990 and 2003. The coefficient of correlation is positive and significantly different 
from zero, but it is fairly low (0.5; the coefficient of correlation with total population growth 
is less than 0.3). Dichotomizing the 12 countries into those with growing rural population and 
those with declining rural population (6 countries in each group), we observe that in countries 
with growing rural population agricultural labor increases fairly fast (at an annual rate of 
nearly 3% between 1990 and 2003), whereas in countries with declining rural population 
agricultural labor declines (at an annual rate of 0.5% between 1990 and 2003). This provides 
some support for the hypothesis that population pressures are a driver for agricultural 
employment.  
 
Table 11 shows the average changes in rural population and in agricultural labor for the three 
regions presented in Figure 10. The decrease in agricultural labor in European CIS is 
associated with decreasing population in general and decreasing rural population in particular. 
The increase in agricultural labor in Central Asia and Transcaucasia is associated with 
increasing rural population. It is interesting to note the difference in changes in total 
population and rural population in Transcaucasia. Total population growth in the three 17 
 
Transcaucasian countries is negative, and yet the rural population is increasing (albeit 
slightly). This is probably the result of civil unrest and outright war that plagued 
Transcaucasia in the early 1990s, resulting in massive refugee flows and urban-to-rural 
migration. Rural areas, with their promise of a private land plot that could be used in the least 
to grow food for the family, probably looked like an attractive option for urban people 
exposed to severe deprivation. The absolute and especially the relative increase in rural 
population drove up the agricultural employment in these countries.  
 
Table 11. Growth of population and agricultural labor 1990-2003 (annual rates of change in percent, 
unweighted averages) 
Region  Population  Rural population  Agricultural labor 
Countries with increasing rural population 
(6)  -0.83  -0.77  -0.51 
Countries with decreasing rural population 
(6)  1.22  1.74  2.97 
Central Asia (5)  1.29  1.63  2.79 
Transcaucasia (3)  -0.50  0.15  3.16 
European CIS (4)  -0.66  -0.70  -2.16 
 
Evolution of agricultural production over time 
 
The value of agricultural production (as measured by Gross Agricultural Output, or GAO) is 
the standard aggregated variable that expresses the output produced by given resources (land 
and labor in our case). In analyzing agricultural production trends in CIS, we are particularly 
fortunate in that consistent GAO data (in volume terms or constant prices) are available since 
1965 (and sometimes even earlier) for all 12 CIS countries. The period up to 1990 is covered 
for all former Soviet republics by the USSR Statistical Yearbooks; the period after 1990 is 
covered by the statistical publications of the CIS Central Statistical Bureau in Moscow (this 
database actually starts in 1980, providing a generous overlap that ensures consistency).  
 
GAO growth thus can be expressed in index numbers starting with 1965=100, 1980=100 (as 
our land and employment series), or 1990=100 (if only the transition period is of interest). To 
visualize long-term trends of agricultural performance, we start with Figure 12, which shows 
the average GAO curve for all 12 CIS countries in percent of 1965 (the black curve) and for 
comparison also in percent of 1980 (the gray curve). The GAO index numbers used to 
construct these curves were calculated as the simple (unweighted) arithmetic average of the 
12 index numbers for all CIS countries. The difference between the two curves is merely 
visual: the curve starting with 1965=100 shows a much longer growth period than the other 
curve truncated to start at 1980=100. In other respects, the two curves are identical, with an 
appropriate vertical shift representing the shift of base year from 1965 to 1980. 
 
The GAO curves clearly show that the agricultural history of the CIS during the last 40 years 
can be divided into four consecutive phases: 
(a) Rapid and continuous agricultural growth between 1965 and 1985 (the Soviet period 
before Gorbachev). 
(b) Stagnation going into slight decline between 1985 and 1990 (the last five years of the 
Soviet regime under Gorbachev). 
(c) Steep decline during the first years of transition (1990-1997). 
(d) General recovery manifested in resumption of agricultural growth after 1997-98. 
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The four phases are clearly related to the policy environment. The stable supportive 
environment characterizing the traditional Soviet attitude toward agriculture was responsible 
for the growth in 1965-85 (growth in production volumes, not necessarily in profitability or 
productivity). The weakening of the Soviet system under Gorbachev produced the stagnation 
phase in 1985-90. The dismantling of the command economy in 1990 with the ensuing 
disruption of all supply and marketing channels was responsible for the decline in the first 
half of the 1990s. Finally, the implementation of substantive reforms after 1997 – in 
particular transition to individual or family agriculture in a significant number of countries – 
















    Figure 12. 
 
 
Figure 13 decomposes the single CIS curve of Figure 12 into three regional curves (as in 
Figure 10): Transcaucasia, Central Asia, and the European CIS. The four phases – growth, 
stagnation, collapse, and recover – are clearly visible in each regional curve. The interesting 
difference is the shift of the point where recovery starts. In Transcaucasia recovery started in 
1991-92, because two of the three Transcaucasian countries – Armenia and Georgia – made 
resolute efforts to dismantle collective agriculture and distribute land to individual farms at 
the very beginning of transition. The rate of recovery subsequently accelerated in 1998, when 
Azerbaijan adopted a farm individualization policy. In the European CIS, recovery began 
around 1998, as two of the four countries – Ukraine and Moldova – began moving in earnest 
toward distribution of land plots to holders of paper land shares. The extent of the recovery in 
this group is moderate, because two other countries – Russia and Belarus – have not done 
much by way of actual land reform. Finally, the recovery in Central Asia began in 1996-1997, 
when all countries began implementing various reform measures in various ways. It is 
particularly important to note that both Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan contributed to this 
recovery despite their image as “slow reformers”, mainly because they allowed farm structure 
to shift from collective form of organization to family leaseholding. The traceable link 
between the beginning of recovery and the implementation of significant farm structure 





GAO 1965-2004 and 1980-2004: 
average for 12 CIS countries

























Partial productivity of agricultural labor and land 
 
Productivity is usually calculated as the value of output per unit of input: output per worker is 
the partial productivity of labor, and output per hectare is the partial productivity of land. Up 
to 1990, the value of output was published by statistical organs in constant rubles for all 
former Soviet republics, and productivity could be computed in these constant rubles per 
worker or per hectare. After 1991 the CIS countries abandoned the ruble and switched to 
different national currencies, so that productivity measures calculated using the value of 
output become noncomparable across countries. An alternative approach in this setting is to 
calculate the productivity index as the ratio of the GAO index to the index of the 
corresponding input (labor or land), making sure that both indexes are expressed to the same 
base year (for a justification of this technique see Lerman, Csaki, and Feder 2004). We used 
the time series of index numbers for GAO, agricultural labor, and agricultural land to 
calculate for each country the two partial productivity indexes for the years 1980-2004 that 















    Figure 14. 
 
 
Figure 14 shows the partial productivity curves aggregated over all CIS countries (simple 
average of the productivity index numbers). The productivity of both land and labor increased 
during the Soviet growth phase (up to about 1987) and then began to decline during the 
Land and Labor Productivity in CIS 1980-2004












averages for 3 groups of countries












stagnation phase (1987-90). The decline accelerated during the transition period and 
agricultural labor productivity began to recover only in the late 1990s, when GAO growth 
had overtaken the general increase of agricultural labor. The productivity of land began to 
increase much earlier, in 1996, due to the huge abandonment of land (especially pastures) that 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan initiated at that time.  
 
The regional productivity curves obtained by decomposing the aggregate CIS curves into 
three regions are shown in Figures 15, 16, 17. The Transcaucasian countries were 
characterized by relatively constant productivity (of both land and labor) until about 1987, 
when productivity began to decline. Productivity of land bounced back already in 1993-94, 
probably due to the sweeping land reform that transferred land to individual farms. 
Productivity of labor generally stagnated, also probably as a result of the transition to 
predominantly individual farming, which acts as a “labor sink” (Lerman and 
Schreinemachers, 2005).  
 
In Central Asia, the productivity of both land and labor remained fairly constant until 1990, 
after which time the productivity of labor declined due to the growing population pressures. 
The productivity of land took off into the stratosphere in 1996, entirely due to the sweeping 
land abandonment programs in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. 
 
In the European CIS the productivity of land and labor follow identical paths: increase up to 






























































    Figure 17. 
 
 
Land and Labor Productivity in European CIS 1980-2004
*Excluding Belarus












Land and Labor Productivity in Transcaucasia 1980-2004










Land and Labor Productivity in Central Asia 1980-2004










Reallocation of productive resources: changes in crop/livestock mix 
 
We have examined the evolution of the two main agricultural resources – land and labor – 
and its impact on changes in partial productivity. Livestock is another important resource in 
agriculture, that alongside with land, contributes to GAO. In this section, we examine the 
changes in livestock in CIS and provide some evidence supporting the view that these 
changes came in response to market signals. 
 
 Prior to 1990, the 12 CIS countries fell into two evenly matched groups: a group of six 
countries with livestock production ranging over time in a rough band between 50% and 60% 
of GAO (“high livestock countries”); and a group of six countries with livestock production 
between 30%-40% of GAO (“low livestock countries”).
3 The separation between the two 
bands was statistically significant (Figure 18). However, there was no clear regional 
attribution: the high-livestock group included two of the five Central Asian countries 
(Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan), three of the four European countries (Russia, Ukraine, 
Belarus), and one Transcaucasian country (Armenia). Three Central Asian countries 
(Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan), two Transcaucasian countries (Azerbaijan and 
Georgia), and one European country (Moldova) were in the low-livestock group. On balance, 
the low-livestock group was mainly characteristic of Central Asia and Transcaucasia, while 
high-livestock production characterized mainly the European countries. Thus, the average 
share of livestock production in the European countries between 1980-89 was 52% of GAO, 
whereas in Transcaucasia and Central Asia the livestock share was 38% and 43%, 
















    Figure 18. 
     
 
After 1990, all the 12 countries bunched together in one band, with livestock production 
varying over time mostly between 35% and 45% of GAO. The averages for the three regions 
converged to 40%-42% (Table 12), which is substantially below the “high” average for 
1980-89 and only slightly higher than the “low” average for 1980-89. Thus, on the whole, 
                                                 
3 The data available on crop/livestock proportions are heterogeneous: prior to 1990 the crop/livestock shares are 
reported based on constant prices; after 1992 the statistics are a mix of calculations based on current and 
constant prices. Moreover, the data for some countries are incomplete.  
 
Livestock production shares: 1980-2005
High: Rus, Ukr, Bel, Kaz, Kyr, Arm; Low: Az, Gru, Taj, Tur, Uzb, Mol













livestock production after 1992 became much less prominent in CIS than during the last 
decade of the Soviet era. 
 
Table 12. Share of livestock production, percent of GAO 
  1980-89  1992-2005 
“High” livestock production  57  47 
“Low” livestock production  33  36 
Transcaucasia  38  42 
Central Asia  43  40 
European CIS  52  42 
 
Changes in livestock numbers 
 
The decrease in the share of livestock in GAO is reflected in the dramatic reduction in herd 
size in CIS. The changes in herd size over time are expressed in terms of the livestock head 
index, which is based on the number of animals calculated in standard head by weighting the 
number of cattle, pigs, sheep, and poultry with weights 1, 0.1, 0.1, and 0.01 respectively.  
 
In all CIS countries (with the exception of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) the livestock herd 
in 2004 is much smaller than it was in the Soviet period up to 1990 (Figure 19A). The 
decline is particularly significant for the European CIS countries, where the livestock herd 
size today is a mere 40% of the herd in the Soviet era. In Transcaucasia and the three Central 
Asian countries the herd size appears to be recovering in recent years, but it is still 
substantially below the level observed in the 1980s. Figure 19A clearly shows three distinct 
patterns of herd size changes: the European CIS exhibits a steady downward trend  (which 
actually began back in 1985); in Transcaucasia, the fairly steep decline that had begun in 
1985 changed to recovery in the early 1990s; in Central Asia3(excluding Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan) the decline started much later, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and it 
changed to  recovery in 1996-97.  
 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan form a separate fourth pattern – no decline ever (Figure 19B). 
Turkmenistan especially stands out because of the steep increase in its livestock herd in 
recent years. It is noteworthy that the increase in livestock numbers began in 1997-98, just as 
Turkmenistan was shifting to family leasehold arrangements for crop production. The 
contractual obligations of the leaseholders to produce mainly the two “strategic” 
commodities – cotton and wheat – for state marketers encouraged an increase in livestock 
production in the small household plots, a family choice that ensured at least some 
diversification of income between revenues from the state (crop production) and sales in the 
market. 
 
In general, we observe in Figure 19A that the sharp downward adjustment of livestock 
changed to growth in countries with rapidly increasing population (Transcaucasia, Central 
Asia). Livestock production is highly labor intensive, and thus provides productive 
































    Figure 19B. 
 
On the other hand, in the European CIS – Russia, Ukraine, Moldova – the decline in livestock 
accompanies a general downward decline of the population (see Figure 5). There is some 
evidence for these countries that the decline in livestock came as a response to lack of 
profitability in livestock production. In Russia, for instance, farms with profitable livestock 
enterprises maintained their herd, while farms with unprofitable livestock production reduced 
the herd by as much as 50%-60% between 1998 and 2003 (Table 13). In Ukraine, corporate 
farms had negative margins of −30% on livestock sales and positive margins close to +30% 
on crop sales (averages for 1995-2004). The reduction of the unprofitable livestock herd by 
as much as 80% between 1995 and 2004 reduced the number of corporate farms reporting 
losses from 80% of all farms in 1997-99 to 40% in 2000-2004. This market-driven behavior 
in the last decade in Ukraine contrasts sharply with the situation in the 1980s, during the era 
of central planning. Then, as today, crop production was profitable, whereas some livestock 
enterprises (especially pigs and sheep) were deeply unprofitable. Yet the herd size and the 
production volumes remained constant, and no attempt was made to adjust production in 
response to profit signals. A similar pattern is observed for Moldova.
4 
  
                                                 
4 Data for Ukraine provided by N. Pugachev, Agricultural Policy Unit, Kiev. Data for Moldova provided by D. 
Cimpoies, Moldova Economics University, Chisinau. All data are based on official statistics. 
Livestock herd by regions (1980=100)
(without Tur, Uzb)











Livestock herd: Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan (1980=100)












Table 13. Change in herd size between 1998 and 2003 by livestock profitability categories (percent of 1998) 









Dairy  88.4  73.1  67.0  39.0  58.5 
Beef  104.3  84.0  77.0  55.5  61.8 
Source: V. Uzun, Agrarian Institute, Moscow, based on official statistics (private communication). 
 
Conclusion: The link between performance and policy 
 
We have demonstrated that the long-term pattern of agricultural development in the former 
Soviet Union and today’s CIS countries is driven by the political environment (Figure 12). 
We have also demonstrated that the cumulative effect of reforms eventually produced a 
significant recovery in agriculture. This did not happen immediately, as it took a better part of 
10 years of sustained reforms for their impact to begin showing in agriculture, but eventually 
the predictions of Western scholars and experts materialized and agricultural growth resumed 
in the CIS countries. It is also quite clear that the exact timing of recovery is associated with 
the depth and decisiveness of agrarian reforms, specifically with the transition to individual 

















GAO growth in CIS is positively correlated with GDP growth (Figure 20), a well-known 
phenomenon in development economics. The existence of a positive correlation, however, 
does not specify the direction of causality: is it the general economic environment (GDP 
growth) that drives agriculture (GAO growth) or conversely, is it agricultural growth in the 
relatively agrarian CIS countries that drives the entire economy? Unfortunately, statistical 
tools do not help us to answer this question, and we are left with the conclusion that the two 
growth measures are closely interrelated, with each measure influencing the other in most 
cases. Overall economic growth thus appears to be conductive to growth in agriculture. 
Positive changes in the overall economic environment lead, among other things, to creation 
of functioning market services, which were missing in the command economy. The 
emergence of market services stimulates agricultural production through improved supply of 
farm inputs, better access to financial facilities, and improvements in sales and marketing 
channels. It is hard to imagine agricultural recovery in a country with a stagnating general 
economy, while a generally positive economic atmosphere reflected in a reasonable GDP 26 
 
growth is likely to induce growth in agriculture. The positive correlation between GDP 
growth and agricultural growth justifies the general sequencing prescription, “get the 
economy in order, and agriculture will fix itself.”  
 
Following the cue of Figure 13, we have tried to explore more rigorously the link between 
agricultural performance and the most obvious manifestation of policy reform in agriculture – 
the share of land in individual use. We have accordingly ran hierarchical clustering of the CIS 
countries by the change in GAO from 1996 to 2004 as a performance measure and percent of 
agricultural  land in individual use in 2000 as a reform measure. Cluster analysis has 
produced four sharply differentiated clusters of countries, which are shown in Table 14 and 
again in Figure 21 (the numbers inside the cluster boundaries are the mean share of land in 
individual use and the cumulative GAO growth 1996-2004 from Table 14). In addition to the 
two basic variables used for clustering – agricultural growth as a performance measure and 
land in individual use as a reform measure – Table 14 shows two alternative reform measures: 
the ECA Agricultural Policy Reform Index and the Land Reform component of this policy 
index for the four clusters (for more details of these indexes see Table 1 and the discussion in 
the first section Setting the stage).  
 
Table 14. Hierarchical clustering  of CIS countries by agricultural growth and share of land in individual 
use 











1  Az, Arm, Kyr, Taj  27.5  160.7  6.8  8 
2  Bel, Rus, Kaz  16.7  116.0  5  4 
3  Gru, Mol, Ukr  30.7  102.3  6.1  6.7 
4  Tur, Uzb  3.15  134.2  2.9  3.5 















   
 
 
For clusters 1 and 2, higher agricultural growth goes with more land in individual use: in 
Figure 21 cluster 1 lies to the “northeast” of cluster 2. The two policy indexes move in the 
same direction: they are higher from cluster 1 than for cluster 2. All in all, cluster 1 
(Azerbaijan, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan,  and Tajikistan) has more land in individual use and is 
more advanced on the reform scale, and these factors are reflected in higher growth since 
1996.  27 
 
Clusters 3 and 4 are outliers. Cluster 4 (Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) should not surprise us: 
these countries do not have much land in individual use according to conventional statistics
5,  
their policy reforms are negligible, and yet they report exceptionally robust agricultural 
growth – probably due to the vagaries of state controlled statistics. But cluster 3 – Georgia, 
Moldova, Ukraine – is a real surprise. These countries have a lot of land in individual use and 
yet they display very sluggish growth performance. The policy index may shed some light on 
this curious behavior: in these countries, the progress of reform is much below the level 
attained in cluster 1, where the countries have a comparable level of land individualization. 
Less progress with reform than in cluster 1 translates into less growth despite the relative 
high share of land in individual tenure. 
 
Table 15. Change in Total Factor Productivity (TFP) and ECA Policy Reform Index for CIS 
 
ECA policy index 1997  TFP growth 1992-97 
Armenia   7.4  22.9 
Georgia   6.2  32.9 
Russia   6.0  7.4 
Kyrgyzstan  5.8  −1.7 
Kazakhstan   5.8  −5.2 
Moldova   5.8  2.4 
Ukraine   5.4  2.5 
Azerbaijan   5.0  −3.9 
Tajikistan   3.8  −11.5 
Uzbekistan  2.2  −10.7 
Turkmenistan   1.8  −29.4 
Belarus   1.6  2.9 
Source: Lerman et al. (2003). 
 
While cluster analysis reveals a positive relationship between GAO growth and policy reform 
measures, we have been unable to detect a statistically significant correlation between various 
performance measures and policy reform indices using raw country data without clustering. 
Further evidence of the link between agricultural performance and policy reform at the 
country level is provided by Lerman et al. (2003), who estimate the growth in Total Factor 
Productivity (TFP) for the CIS countries between 1992 and 1997. TFP growth is calculated 
by standard Solow growth calculus taking the ratio of the change in output to the change in 
the aggregated basket of inputs.
6 TFP growth aggregating changes in productivity of land, 
labor, and other farm inputs constitutes a much more appropriate measure of performance 
improvement than GAO growth. Unfortunately, TFP growth is much more difficult to 
estimate than GAO growth, which explains why it is only seldom used in analysis. The TFP 
growth for 1997-97 and the ECA Agricultural Policy Reform Index for 1997 are presented 
for the 12 CIS countries in Table 15. We clearly see a strong positive correlation between 
TFP growth and the policy reform index. The coefficient of correlation is 0.7, and only three 
countries – Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Belarus – deviate from the nearly monotonic 
relationship between TFP growth and the policy index. These findings, like the clustering 
results, suggest that implemented policies affected recovery in agriculture. 
 
                                                 
5 Land in individual leasehold arrangements is not reported as individual tenure in the official statistics of these 
countries. 
6 The aggregated basket of inputs is calculated by weighting five conventional inputs – arable land, agricultural 
labor, farm machinery, fertilizer use, and livestock – by the coefficients of the meta-production function 
estimated for the CIS countries. 28 
 
Our final attempt to link agricultural performance with policy reform is based on a totally 
non-agricultural measure of reform. This is the so-called Sachs-Warner Openness Indicator, 
which dichotomizes countries into “open” and “closed” by a trade-based measure 




Prior to 1994, all CIS countries were classified as closed. In 1994 only two CIS countries 
were classified as open: Moldova and Kyrgyzstan. Four more countries “opened up” between 
1994 and 1996: Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan. Russia and Ukraine were 
classified as closed even in 1999 (as were Belarus, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and of course 
Turkmenistan). It may of interest to note that the open countries are “small” while the closed 
countries are “large”. 
 
We have calculated the cumulative growth in both GDP and GAO between 1990-1994 (the 
early reform phase) and then between 1994-2004 (the agricultural recovery phase). It turns 
out that the “open” countries did much worse than the “closed” countries in the early 
transition period 1990-1994 by both GDP growth and GAO growth. In fact, the “open” 
countries dropped much more than the “closed” countries during the initial decline phase. But 
then their rebound was much stronger in 1994-2004: the “open” countries overtook the 
“closed” countries by a very wide margin by both GDP and GAO. These results are 
summarized in Table 16.  
 
Table 16. Growth and openness in CIS countries: the decline period 1990-1994 and the recovery period 
1994-2004 
Openness status as of 1999 
Cumulative GDP growth  Cumulative GAO growth 
1990-1994  1994-2004  1990-1994  1994-2004 
Open:   Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, 
Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan  −55.7  65.0  −35.1  43.3 
Closed:  Belarus, Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, 
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan  −31.8  40.6  −22.9  5.0 
*Note: All CIS countries were “closed” before 1994. The “open” countries changed their status between 1994 
and 1996. 
 
While this evidence is not conclusive, it is certainly quite compelling. All this adds up to a 
fairly clear conclusion: better agricultural performance is achieved by countries that are more 
advanced on the path of reform, irrespective of how we measure reform – whether by share 
of land in individual farming, by agriculture-related policy reforms (as in the ECA index), or 
by non-agricultural reform indicators (the Openness Indicator). The weight of the cumulative 
evidence seems to support our initial hypothesis quite strongly. 
  
                                                 
7 The openness indicator was introduced by Sachs and Warner (1995); some fascinating update work was done 
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